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CASE NOTE 
Constitutional Law-FAIR WARNING OF RETROACTIVE LAW IS SUF- 
FICIENT COMPLIANCE WITH THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE-DO bbert V. 
Florida, 432 U. S. 282 (1977). 
Ernest Dobbert murdered two of his children between De- 
cember 31,1971, and April 8,1972. On July 17,1972, the Supreme 
Court of Florida, pursuant to Furman v. Georgia, l invalidated the 
death penalty provision of the murder statuteZ in effect at the 
time of Dobbert's  rimes.^ Five months later, the Florida Legisla- 
ture enacted a revised death penalty statute for murder in the 
first degree.' In accordance with the provisions of the 1972 revised 
statute, Dobbert was convicted in 1974 of first degree murder in 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Florida and sentenced to die notwith- 
standing a jury recommendation of life imprisonment. 
The conviction was appealed to the Supreme Court of Flor- 
ida on several grounds, including an argument that the imposi- 
tion of the death sentence was a violation of the ex post facto 
clause of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
Florida affirmed the conviction without ruling on the ex post 
facto argument? In a 6-3 decision, the United States Supreme 
Court also affirmed, holding that the retroactive application of 
the death penalty statute was not a violation of the constitutional 
prohibition of ex post facto laws because Dobbert had received 
"fair warning" of Florida's intention to seek the death penalty for 
his ~r i rnes .~  
A. The Prohibition Against Ex Post Facto Laws 
The bias against retroactive legislation is by no means pecu- 
liar to the United States. It is a principle of free government and 
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082, 921.141 (197l)(amended 1972). 
3. Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1972). 
4. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 72-724 (amending FLA. STAT. $8 775.082, 921.141 (1971) (cur- 
rent version at b. STAT. Am. §§ 775.082, 921.141 (West 1976)). 
5. Dobbert v. State, 328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). The 
Supreme Court of Florida affirmed after considering issues involving jury instructions for 
attempted homicide, the denial of a motion for change of venue, and the discretionary 
imposition of the death penalty notwithstanding a jury recommendation of life imprison- 
ment. 
6. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977). 
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jurisprudence with deep historical roots. There is evidence that 
Demosthenes of ancient Greece argued effectively against a law 
because it was retroactive.' Roman law, as incorporated in the 
Corpus Juris Civilis, prohibited retroactive laws except where 
expressly allowed by the statutory language.' English common 
law adopted this aspect of the Roman Code "as a guide to the 
construction of  statute^,"^ and the United States later followed 
the English example by prohibiting ex post facto laws in its Con- 
stitution. 
1. Constitutional origin 
The United States Constitution declares without qualifica- 
tion that "no state shall . . . pass . . . any ex post facto Law."lo 
Although the historical record is somewhat vague, it is generally 
believed that most of the Framers of the Constitution intended 
the ex post facto clause to be interpreted literally; that is, "a law 
made after the doing of the thing to which it relates, and retroact- 
ing upon it" was to be prohibited.ll This is evidenced to some 
degree by Madison's notes which reveal that most of the delegates 
in discussing whether to include such a clause spoke of retroactive 
laws in the most general of terms without any qualifying or limit- 
ing language.12 For example, a proposal to limit the clause to 
criminal laws was rejected by the Convention.13 In addition, feel- 
ings against retroactive legislation were strong at  this particular 
time because several of the delegates had recently witnessed un- 
just retroactive legislation in some of the states," and an unquali- 
fied prohibition of all retroactive laws was probably seen as the 
only sure way of preventing any further such injustices.15 
7. Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Binciple of Jurisprud- 
ence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775, 775 (1936). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 776. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8 10, c1. 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, 4 9, cl. 3 similarly prohibits 
enactmelit of federal ex post facto laws. 
11. Crosskey, The True Meaning of the Constitutional Prohibition of Ex-Post-Facto- 
Laws, 14 U. CHI. L. REV. 539, 539 (1947). 
12. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, a t  375-76 (M. Farrand ed. 
1966). 
13. Id. a t  617. Governor Edmund Randolph was a chief supporter of this proposal. 3 
id. at 328. 
14. Two examples of such laws were the "pine-barren law" of South Carolina and the 
paper money acts of Rhode Island. Crosskey, supra note 11, at 540. 
15. Ironically, many of the delegates were against the inclusion of the ex post facto 
clause not because they favored retroactive laws but because they felt such laws were so 
obviously unjust they were void in and of themselves. Id. 
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However, a small minority of delegates were opposed to an 
all-inclusive prohibition. One of the most notable of these was 
George Mason, who wrote about the potential necessity of retro- 
active laws: "[?]here never was nor can be a legislature but 
must and will make such laws, when necessity and the public 
safety require them . . . . "18 
2. Judicial interpretation of the ex post facto clause 
Despite the apparent majority intent of the Framers to ban 
all retroactive laws, the Supreme Court refused to interpret the 
prohibition literally when in 1798 it was first called upon to adju- 
dicate an ex post facto issue in Calder v .  Bull. l7 Justice Chase, in 
his opinion,18 recognized that the clause was designed to prevent 
unjust legislation, but narrowed the thrust of the clause to pro- 
hibit only retroactive criminal legislation disadvantageous to an 
accused. Emerging from the opinion is a fairly definitive guide- 
line describing the characteristics of an unconstitutional ex post 
facto law: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing 
of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and 
punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, 
or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every 
law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater 
punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when commit- 
ted. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and 
receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at 
the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the 
offender. lB 
In limiting the ex post facto clause to criminal laws, Justice 
Chase reasoned that constitutional prohibitions such as the one 
against the impairing of contracts were inserted to govern retroac- 
tive legislation affecting private rights? Justice Chase added 
that the above delineation illustrated the types of retroactive 
changes in the law that are "manifestly unjust and oppres s i~e ."~~  
Since Calder the Supreme Court has relied extensively on 
16. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 640 (M. Farrand ed. 1966). 
17. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
18. Individual Supreme Court justices during this period wrote separate opinions for 
each case. Thus Justice Chase's language technically cannot be considered to be the 
majority view of the Court, although it has reached that status in subsequent cases. 
19. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 390 (emphasis added). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 391 (emphasis added). 
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Justice Chase's categories as a description of the types of retroac- 
tive changes that are to be declared unconstitutional. In addition, 
the Court has articulated a more general standard, first adopted 
in Kring u. Missouri, 22 that a retroactive law altering the situation 
of a party to his disadvantage is unconstitutional.23 By imple- 
menting these standards, the Court has adopted a categorical 
approach to the determination of ex post facto laws. A significant 
outgrowth of this approach is the Court's fairly consistent holding 
that the ex post facto clause applies only to changes affecting an 
accused's substantive rights.'Wence, even when a retroactive 
procedural change works to the particular disadvantage of an 
accused the Supreme Court has held the change constitutional 
because it does not involve a substantive interest in which the 
accused has a vested right.25 
An example of the Court's refusal to invalidate a retroactive 
procedural change is Hopt u. Utah,26 where the defendant was 
implicated in a crime by the testimony of a convicted felonen 
Such testimony was inadmissible when the defendant committed 
the crime but was statutorily declared admissible before his 
trial." The Supreme Court held that the change was procedural 
and its retroactive application was not prohibited by the ex post 
facto clause because the nature of the crime and the amount of 
proof necessary for conviction remained unaltered? The Court 
concluded that to "remove existing restrictions upon the compe- 
tency of certain classes of persons as witnesses, relates to modes 
of procedure only, in which no one can be said to have a vested 
right, and which the State, upon grounds of public policy, may 
regulate a t  pleasure."30 
In the area most closely related to the instant case, the Court 
reaffirmed Calder by holding in Lindsey u. Washingtons1 that an 
increase in punishment is a substantive change that will be held 
unconstitutional if applied retroactively to a defendant's disad- 
- - - - - -- -- 
22. 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1882). 
23. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 
(1925); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). 
24. E.g., Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 
(1898); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882). 
25. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 590 (1884). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 587. 
28. Id. at 587-88. 
29. Id. at 590. 
30. Id. 
31. 301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937). 
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vantage.32 In that case, the Court indicated that in determining 
the constitutionality of a retroactive law it compares the practical 
operation of the new statute with the practical operation of the 
old statute under which the accused would have been prose- 
c ~ t e d . ~ ~  If the new statute works to the "material disadvantage 
of the wrongdoer" then its retroactive application will be declared 
un~onstitutional.~~ Thus, in Lindsey, a statute making a fifteen- 
year sentence mandatory where previously the judge had discre- 
tion to impose a lesser sentence was held unconstitutional when 
applied retroactively. 
3. Present status of the ex post facto clause 
Since the 1937 Lindsey case, the Supreme Court of the 
United States has not decided another case involving the issue of 
increased punishment. This lack of controversy can probably be 
attributed to the well-delineated Calder and Lindsey35 rules for 
ex post facto violations. This is revealed to some extent in recent 
state court decisions involving ex post facto issues.36 In most of 
these decisions, the courts quote some variation of the Calder 
categories in an almost mechanical fashion. Only when the dis- 
tinction between substantive and procedural changes in the law 
is unclear do the courts go much beyond an unexamined applica- 
tion of Justice Chase's delineati~n.~' 
As a general rule, then, the status of the ex post facto clause 
has remained essentially unchanged since it was first interpreted 
over 170 years ago. It is viewed by the courts as a prohibition 
against certain disadvantageous retroactive laws and its primary 
purpose is broadly stated as the deterrence of "unjust and oppres- 
sive" legislation. 
B. Setting for the Ex Post Facto Determination 
in the Instant Case 
Following the United States Supreme Court's declaration in 
32. Id. at 401. 
33. Id. at 400. 
34. Id. at 401. 
35. The Lindsey rule actually incorporates both the Calder and Kring standards. 
36. E.g., Myers v. District Court, 184 Colo. 81, 518 P.2d 836 (1974); State v. Bunn, 
50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528 (1968); People v. Myers, 44 Ill. App. 3d 860, 359 N.E.2d 197 
(1977); State v. Howard, 182 Neb. 411,155 N.W.2d 339 (1967); People v. Warren, 79 Misc. 
2d 777, 360 N.Y.S.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. 1974). 
37. E.g., People v. Ward, 50 Cal. 2d 702,328 P.2d 777 (1958); People v. Martinez, 82 
Misc. 2d 56, 368 N.Y .S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 19%). 
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Furman v. Georgias8 that Georgia's death penalty statute was 
unconstitutional, the Supreme Court of Florida in Donaldson u. 
Sack invalidated its own state death penalty provision, indicating 
that future "capital" offenders should be given life imprison- 
ment." In addition, the Florida Code provided that in the event 
of such an invalidation the sentences of persons previously con- 
demned to death were to be commuted to life impri~onment.~~ By 
December 1972, however, less than five months after the invalida- 
tion, the Florida Legislature had enacted a new death penalty 
statute4' that eventually passed constitutional muster in 1976.42 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld 
the retroactive application of the new death penalty in the instant 
case. In reaching its conclusion, however, the Florida court ig- 
nored the ex post facto  consideration^.^^ Only when the case 
reached the United States Supreme Court did these considera- 
tions emerge as significant issues. 
In holding that the sentencing of Dobbert according to the 
provisions of the 1972 Florida statute was constitutional, the 
United States Supreme Court rejected three separate ex post 
facto arguments. Two of the three arguments were rejected after 
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
39. 265 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1972). 
40. FLA. STAT. # 775.082(3) (1971), as amended by 1972 Fla. Laws. ch. 72-118 (current 
version at  FLA. STAT. ANN. # 775.082 (West 1976)). 
41. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 72-724 (amending FLA. STAT. # #  775.082, 921.141 (1971))(cur- 
rent version at FLA. STAT. ANN. # #  775.082, 921.141 (West 1976)). 
42. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
This rapid change of penalties produced at least one other case where the Florida 
court had to decide the applicability of the new statute to a capital crime committed 
before it was enacted. Lee v. State, 340 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1976). In that case the defendant, 
Lee, who had been sentenced to death a week prior to the Furman decision, filed a motion 
which was granted by the trial court to reduce his sentence to life imprisonment. The state 
appealed, and while the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of Florida came down 
with its decision in Donaldson and shortly thereafter commuted the death sentences of 
other Florida defendants to life imprisonment. In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1972); 
Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972). By the time Lee's case was decided by the 
Supreme Court of Florida, Florida had enacted the new death penalty statute. Conse- 
quently, the case was remanded for sentencing according to the new procedure. Upon 
remand, Lee was again sentenced to death and again appealed, whereupon the Supreme 
Court of Florida reduced the sentence to life imprisonment without addressing any ex post 
facto issues. Surprisingly, this opinion, which came down shortly after Dobbert v. State, 
328 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1976), did not reconcile or even mention Dobbert despite the opposite 
holdings in the two cases. 
43. The court also rejected equal protection and fair trial arguments. 432 U.S. at 301- 
03. 
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comparing the standards of punishment contained in the 1972 
statute with those in the prior statute without reference to the 
intervening Florida Supreme Court decision in Donaldson v. 
Sack. The third argument was rejected because the invalidated 
statute gave "fair warning" of the punishment imposed by the 
revised statute. 
The first argument was that the procedure under the new 
death penalty statute, which allowed the trial judge to overrule 
a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment, violated the ex 
post facto clause because it worked to Dobbert's disadvantage in 
that such a recommendation could not have been overruled under 
the old statute." Relying on Hopt v. Utah,45 the Court rejected 
this argument by concluding that even if the change ultimately 
worked to the defendant's particular disadvantage it was gener- 
ally an ameliorative procedural change and hence did not consti- 
tute an ex post facto law.46 
A second argument was that the lengthening of the minimum 
parole eligibility time for life imprisonment under the new statute 
made the whole statute more onerous than the old one and there- 
fore unconstitutional in its application to Dobbert." The Court 
dismissed this argument by holding that, since Dobbert was not 
sentenced to life imprisonment, the increase in parole eligibility 
time had no bearing on his particular punishment and thus did 
not work to his di~advantage.~~ 
The third of the ex post facto arguments required the Court 
to determine what effect should be given to the fact that the old 
death penalty provision was invalidated and a new one enacted 
during the interim between Dobbert's criminal acts and the date 
of his trialmu The argument was that, inasmuch as the old death 
penalty provision was later declared unconstitutional, there was 
technically no valid death penalty in effect when the crimes were 
committed, and hence the new death penalty statute created an 
unconstitutionally retroactive increase in p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~  The 
Court rejected this argument also, relying on Chicot County 
Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank5* for the proposition that 
a court does not necessarily have to give full retroactive effect to 
44. Id. at 292. 
45. 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
46. 432 U.S. at 292-97. 
47. Id. at 298. 
48. Id. at 300-01. 
49. Id. at 297-98. 
50. Id. at 297. 
51. 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 
4841 CASE NOTE 491 
a judicial declaration of a statute's uncon~titutionality.~~ The 
Court added that the existence of the earlier statute "provided 
fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State as- 
cribed to the act of murder"53 and therefore provided "sufficient 
compliance with the ex post facto provision of the United States 
Constitution. "54 
Justice Stevens in a dissenting opinion tersely criticized the 
"fair warning" rationale, claiming it would "defeat the very pur- 
pose of the [ex post facto] C l a ~ s e . " ~ ~  He advocated instead strict 
adherence to the test in Lindsey v. Washington, which, in his 
opinion, better protects against "improperly motivated or capri- 
cious legislation. "56 
In. ANALYSIS 
The crucial issue in the instant case, and the only one the 
dissent addressed, was whether the presence of the old death 
penalty provision, in effect a t  the time of Dobbert's crimes but 
subsequently invalidated, justified the retroactive application of 
the new death penalty provision to those crimes in light of the ex 
post facto clause. In holding that the new statute may be applied 
retroactively, the Court reached the right result. In reaching that 
result, however, the Court relied on an unpersuasive and inade- 
quate rationale. This Note will focus on that rationale and sug- 
gest a more persuasive approach as well as discuss the implica- 
tions of the holding. 
A. The Court's Rationale 
In holding that the presence of the old statute justified the 
retroactive application of the new statute, the Court's reasoning 
was brief and conclusory. Basically the majority relied on two 
contentions: (1) Dobbert's argument "mock[ed] the substance 
of the Ex Post Facto C l a ~ s e , " ~  and ( 2 )  Dobbert's argument was 
"at odds" with Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State 
Bank? Both of these contentions need to be examined in light of 
Supreme Court precedent and the points raised in Justice Ste- 
vens' dissent. 
52. 432 U.S. at 297-98. 
53. Id. at 297. 
54. Id. at 298. 
55. Id. at 308 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. Id. at 307. 
57. Id. at 297 (majority opinion). 
58. 308 U S .  371 (1940). 
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1. Failure to adequately identify the substance of the ex post 
facto clause 
By not adequately explaining what it considered to be the 
substance of the ex post facto clause, the majority failed to per- 
suasively support its conclusion that Dobbert's "sophistic argu- 
ment mock[ed] the substance" of the clause.5Q The Court went 
no further in identifying the "substance" of the clause than to 
quote from an earlier opinion that the clause was "intended to 
secure substantial personal rights against arbitrary and oppres- 
sive  legislation."^ If the Court meant this to be a complete 
statement of the substance of the ex post facto clause then it is 
difficult to understand how a refusal to retroactively apply the 
death penalty to Dobbert's crime would "mock" such a purpose. 
There seems to be no better way to insure against the possibility 
of "arbitrary and oppressive" retroactive legislation than by 
totally prohibiting retroactivity in circumstances such as those of 
the instant case where an accused is disadvantaged. 
The Court attempted to justify its position on the ground 
that Dobbert's argument ran counter to the warning he received 
of the penalty Florida would seek for his crime." While it may be 
true that the old statute constituted such a warning, this does not 
explain why a refusal to retroactively impose the new statute 
would, as the Court stated it, mock the substance of the ex post 
facto clause. Therefore, it must be inferred that the Court was 
actually relying upon a new view of the substance of the ex post 
facto clause: that the ex post facto clause is primarily designed 
to protect a defendant's "fair warning" rights and if a retroactive 
law does not jeopardize these rights then the ex post facto clause 
does not apply. By leaving such a significant interpretation to 
inference without further justification or explanation, however, 
the opinion only generates confusion. 
Certainly, Justice Stevens was not persuaded by the major- 
ity's rationale and the inferences to be drawn from it. In fact, he 
argued in his dissent that the Court's holding would actually 
defeat what he sees as one of the primary purposes of the 
clause-the promoting of impartial legislation." If this were in- 
deed a major purpose of the clause, then Justice Stevens' conten- 
tion is somewhat persuasive. In view of the atrociousness of Dob- 
59. 432 U.S. at 297. 
60. Id. at 293 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925)). 
61. Id. at 297. 
62. Id. at 307-08 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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bert's crimes and the extensive publicity they received,63 it is not 
difficult to imagine that the Florida legislature might have had 
Dobbert specifically in mind in enacting the new death penalty 
statute. 
The Court could have much more effectively supported this 
part of its opinion by explicitly stating that the ex post facto 
clause is ultimately a vindication of the fair warning principle 
that an accused must have been apprised of what constitutes a 
criminal act and what penalty is attached to that act.64 It can be 
argued that the ex post facto clause is only aimed at one particu- 
lar evil: the arbitrariness and oppressiveness of retroactive legis- 
lation that redefines the criminality of and punishment attached 
to conduct where there is no fair warning of the elements of the 
crime or its puni~hment.'~ Other arbitrary and oppressive aspects 
of retroactive legislation, as well as of legislation in general, are 
to be circumscribed by other provisions of the Constitution such 
as the due process and equal protection clauses and the prohibi- 
tion of bills of attainder? 
Had the Court explicitly followed this sort of rationale in- 
stead of only implying it, it could have clearly established a more 
reasonable view of the operation of the ex post facto clause.67 
Since there is nothing inherently arbitrary or oppressive about 
retroactivity, the Court could have expressly rejected a categori- 
63. Id. a t  303 (majority opinion). 
64. Fair warning of what constitutes a criminal act would also include changes in the 
rules of evidence, as noted in the Calder opinion. However, not all changes in evidentiary 
standards would raise fair warning concerns. See Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on 
Legislative Power, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1491, 1515-16 (1975). 
65. This position is given support in the dicta of a t  least two Supreme Court deci- 
sions. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 
378 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1964). 
In his dissent to the instant case, Justice Stevens stated that fair warning "does not 
provide a workable test for deciding particular cases" because the presumption that a 
person is aware of a law on the statute books is "inadequate." 432 U.S. at 307-09 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). While there admittedly would be problems in proving actual fair warning 
in a particular case, a presumption of fair warning arising from the mere existence of a 
prior statute on the statute books should be no more difficult to apply than the common 
presumption, often applied to prospective laws, that all men know the law. 
66. Thus, Justice Stevens' concern about partial legislation could be remedied by 
equal protection or bill of attainder arguments. 
67. A more explicit and clearer statement of the Court's rationale would have satis- 
fied the concerns of some commentators who claim that the Supreme Court has given little 
guidance in defining a workable test for unconstitutional retroactive laws. Slawson, 
Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 48 CALIF. L. 
REV. 216, 235 (1960); Note, Ex Post Facto Limitations on Legislative Power, 73 MICH. L. 
REV. 1491, 1492-94 (1975). 
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cal approach, thereby opening the way for courts to examine in 
each case the underlying purpose of the ex post facto clause to 
determine if it was violated by the legislation in question. 
2. Failure to reconcile Lindsey v. Washingtons8 
By not fully reconciling Lindsey v. Washington with the in- 
stant case, the Court also failed to persuasively support its con- 
clusion that Dobbert's argument was "at odds" with Chicot 
County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank. 6g Citing Chicot 
for the proposition that a judicially invalidated law can have 
some limited prospective effect, the Court held that the old law 
had the "prospective effect" of justifying the retroactive applica- 
tion of the new death penalty because the old law provided suffi- 
cient fair warning to comply with the ex post facto clause.'O While 
Chicot gives some support for this holding, it by no means di- 
rectly refutes the holding in Lindsey quoted by the dissent that 
a retroactive law working "to the detriment or material disadvan- 
tage of the wrongdoer"71 is unconstitutional. Even conceding that 
under Chicot the invalidated statute could serve as a warning to 
Dobbert of the penalty which Florida would seek to impose, the 
inquiry is not ended, for if the express language of Lindsey is 
followed it would appear that regardless of the notice Dobbert 
received the retroactive application of the new death penalty 
would be unconstitutional because it worked to his "detriment" 
in that he received a greater penalty than he would have received 
had the new statute not been passed. 
The Court could have strengthened its reliance on Chicot 
and distinguished Lindsey by pointing out an obvious but impor- 
tant difference between the instant case and Lindsey. In Lindsey 
no argument could be made that the defendant received fair 
warning of the retroactive new law because it was substantially 
different than the law in existence when the defendant commit- 
ted his crime." Dobbert, on the other hand, arguably received fair 
warning of the penalty retroactively imposed because it was sub- 
- 
68. 301 U.S. 397 (1937). 
69. 308 U.S. 371 (1940). 
70. 432 U.S. at 297-98. 
71. Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U S .  397, 401 (1937), quoted in Dobbert v. Florida, 
432 U.S. at 305 (Stevens, J. ,  dissenting). 
72. The law in effect at the time of defendant's crime allowed the judge to fix a prison 
term at less than the maximum 15 years. The challenged retroactive law provided for a 
mandatory 15-year prison term with certain changes in the parole procedure. Lindsey v. 
Washington, 301 U.S. at 398. 
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stantially the same as the penalty in existence at  the time his 
crime was committed. 
Because of this difference in facts, Lindsey does not directly 
control the outcome of the instant case as Justice Stevens main- 
tained in his dissent. To give the Lindsey language literal effect 
without any consideration of the fact that Dobbert had fair warn- 
ing would be to ignore what is arguably the essence of the ex post 
facto clause-protection against fair warning deprivations. The 
more reasonable approach is to hold that the Lindsey "test"73 
applies only when fair warning is absent. By thus requiring a fair 
warning determination before a retroactive law can be declared 
unconstitutional, the rather inflexible Lindsey test is clarified so 
that it can accomodate unusual circumstances like those of the 
instant case. 
The equity of this rationale when applied to the instant case 
is further borne out by examining the judicial invalidation of the 
original death penalty provision. In reality, the Florida Supreme 
Court was not invalidating the death penalty per se but rather the 
procedure for imposing it. This is evidenced by the fact that once 
the procedure was modified by the legislature in the 1972 revision 
the Supreme Court of Florida and the United States Supreme 
Court both upheld it." Thus, the five-month period between in- 
validation of the old law and the passing of the new law was a 
technical aberration that reflected neither the Florida Supreme 
Court's nor the legislature's view on the death penalty. To allow 
Dobbert to take advantage of this technicality would indeed be a 
mockery not only of the Florida law but also of the intent of the 
ex post facto clause. 
B. Implications of the Holding 
In holding the retroactive application of the Florida death 
penalty statute constitutional, the Supreme Court effectively re- 
jected a mechanical application of the Calder categories so often 
relied on by previous opinions. Although this decision can proba- 
bly be attributed more to the unique factual circumstances of the 
instant case than to any conscious effort on the part of the Court 
to reinterpret the clause, it may signal the beginning of a signifi- 
cant doctrinal turn toward a more reasonable standard for deter- 
mining the constitutionality of retroactive laws. It also sets a 
73. The Lindsey "test" holds unconstitutional those retroactive statutes which work 
to the "material disadvantage of the wrongdoer." 301 U.S. at 401-02. 
74. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
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precedent, although not a clearly stated one, for looking beyond 
, the technical consequences of a retroactive law to the presence of 
actual injustice in deciding ex post facto questions. At the same 
time, the holding identifies the specific injustice to be prohibited 
by suggesting that no retroactive law will be held unconstitu- 
tional unless it violates an accused's right to a fair warning of the 
elements and penalty of the crime he is charged with. 
However, the impact of the above advantages may be more 
theoretical than practical. It is likely that most cases involving 
ex post facto questions will parallel the facts of Lindsey more 
closely than those of the instant case, thereby eliminating any 
persuasive argument that an accused received fair warning of the 
retroactive law. Consequently, the traditional categorical tests 
will still play an important role in resolving most future ex post 
facto issues. 
Gene S. Martin, Jr. 
